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Medicare is facing severe financial strains
that threaten its future viability. On a per capita
basis, Medicare spending is increasing at twice
the rate of the gross domestic product, and,
according to Medicare’s chief actuary, the pro-
gram is facing a breathtaking funding shortfall
of $62 trillion—nearly six times larger than the
much-discussed shortfall in Social Security. The
newly enacted Medicare prescription drug bene-
fit could cost more than $700 billion over the
next 10 years and will only add to the program’s
financial woes.
That new drug law would provide a sizable net
benefit to retirees and older workers without
existing coverage, even if Congress immediately
funded it through higher Medicare payroll taxes.
Workers born before 1965—baby boomers and
current retirees—would receive a net gain of about
$20,000 per capita. Younger workers and all
future generations, however, would suffer net
losses of between $2,500 and $4,000 per capita.
Furthermore, failure to include meaningful
Medicare reforms in the drug program may cause
steeper cost escalations, diluting its benefits.
Congress should revisit the Medicare pre-
scription drug program and insist on significant
market-based reforms, not merely an ever-
expanding array of benefits.
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Introduction
Even more than Social Security, the
Medicare program is in deep trouble, facing
demographic and financial pressures that
threaten the future viability of the program.
The demand for health care benefits will rise
steeply as the retiree population balloons and
retirement life spans grow longer. An explosion
of the population of those eligible for Medicare
coverage—78 million baby boomers—will com-
mence this decade.
Health care providers—physicians, hospi-
tals, and others—have developed better diag-
nostic and treatment methods for many dis-
eases. Technological development will likely
continue in the future, adding to our arsenal
of effective treatments. However, new treat-
ments are likely to be expensive because of
high development costs. Therefore, under
current Medicare reimbursement rules,
spending per Medicare enrollee will also con-
tinue to grow rapidly, adding to spending
growth due to purely demographic changes. 
That implies growing pressure on the fed-
eral budget to find dollars to continue feeding
the Medicare beast. Medicare expenditures
were 0.7 percent of gross domestic product in
1970 and grew to 2.6 percent in 2003, reflect-
ing rapid increases in the factors affecting the
growth of health care costs. That trend is like-
ly to continue at an accelerated pace. To meet
the rising demand for more and better quality
health care and yet slow the pressure generat-
ed by Medicare on the budget, Medicare
reforms need to be considered and imple-
mented—the sooner the better. 
Simply spending money does not necessar-
ily lead to better health care. Despite the explo-
sive growth in Medicare spending, the pro-
gram still does not provide complete coverage
of seniors’ health care needs. Responding to
one of Medicare’s inadequacies, Congress
passed the Medicare Modernization Act in
2003 to add prescription drug coverage. The
drug coverage attempts to restructure Medi-
care benefits in the face of changing health
care needs of seniors and the disabled—who,
in the future, are more likely to rely on pre-
scription drugs than on traditional medical
treatments and procedures. 
The drug coverage, however, adds to the
financial challenge facing Medicare. In their
2004 report, the Boards of Trustees of the
Federal Hospital and Medical Insurance Trust
Funds estimated that the drug benefit’s total
cost is about $16.6 trillion in present value
terms.1 That comes on top of the already mas-
sive financial shortfall in Medicare, some
$45.0 trillion even without the new benefit.2
By enacting the drug benefit, Congress has
increased the financial burden of Medicare by
more than a third. In 2006, when the full
phase-in of prescription drug coverage is com-
pleted, Medicare’s projected expenditures will
immediately jump to 3.4 percent of GDP.
Such rapid growth in Medicare costs is
unsustainable, even for the largest economy
in the world. We need prudent reforms that
will encourage competition among health
plans, give beneficiaries realistic choices, and
begin to slow the overall growth of Medicare
spending. Adding a drug benefit alone with-
out thorough reforms sharply increases the
cost of Medicare to future taxpayers and jeop-
ardizes the financial viability of the program.
In this paper, we examine the likely cost of
a Medicare prescription drug benefit over the
next 10 years and in the decades to come. We
make three points:
• Actual program cost for Medicare pre-
scription drugs through 2015 will prob-
ably exceed the $720 billion that has
been estimated as the cost of the benefit
under current law. 
• Constraints could be placed on spend-
ing for prescription drugs, but that
approach would likely limit the avail-
ability of new and beneficial drugs. A
more comprehensive strategy is needed
to limit taxpayer cost while ensuring
that beneficiaries receive appropriate
services.
• The long-term cost of the new drug ben-
efit is astronomical, and most of it will
likely fall on our children and grand-
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children. We provide estimates of how
large those costs would be for the aver-
age person under official economic
assumptions and demographic projec-
tions. 
The Drug Benefit Will Cost 
More Than We Were Told
In November 2003, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that the federal cost
of the Medicare drug benefit amounts to
$409 billion through 2013.3 Many observers,
including us, thought that estimate could
greatly understate actual outlays under a
Medicare drug benefit. First, the new pro-
gram has many novel features, requiring the
CBO to make numerous assumptions about
how the complex policies proposed in the
two bills would actually work. The resulting
estimate is highly uncertain, and there is
nothing in the legislation that would hold
spending to $400 billion. Second, the CBO
estimate cannot account for future legisla-
tion that could substantially increase pro-
gram outlays (see Appendix). 
Estimates from the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services are much higher than
those from the CBO. The president’s fiscal
year 2005 budget, released in February 2004,
indicated that the MMA would cost federal
taxpayers $534 billion through 2013.4 The
following month, the Medicare trustees clar-
ified that report. Medicare Part D (the drug
subsidy program) would require general rev-
enue infusions of $690 billion over the next
decade.5 In September 2004 the president’s
budget office increased the spending esti-
mate by another $42 billion, bringing the
total (federal and state) cost to $732 billion
through 2014. Thus, within one year of pas-
sage, the estimated cost of drug coverage
grew by 86 percent.6 The latest budget for fis-
cal year 2006 escalates the spending on pre-
scription drug coverage to $1.2 trillion—an
increase of $470 billion, simply from moving
the budget window ahead by 1 year! Now the
10-year net cost through 2015 is estimated at
$720 billion.7 This indicates the hazard of
making a long-term policy on the basis of a
short-term evaluation of its cost.
Clearly, the new drug subsidy law poses an
unusually difficult challenge in making cost
estimates. It is a major departure from the
way Medicare has operated in the past. Many
of the features of the new benefit are unique,
and the empirical evidence used to develop
the cost estimate is more limited than usual.
Even the $720 billion estimate may severe-
ly underpredict the actual net cost of the pro-
gram. The new drug plan may be less effective
at containing costs than is assumed in mak-
ing the estimates; more employers than
expected may drop retiree drug coverage
under their plans; newer drugs may be more
expensive than assumed; more retirees may
enroll in the drug program than assumed;
enrollees may demand more drug treatments
than assumed; physicians may begin prescrib-
ing more drugs to seniors than assumed; con-
solidation in the pharmaceutical industry
may lead to less competition, greater monop-
oly power, and higher drug prices. In all of
those cases, federal spending would come in
substantially larger than estimated.
Actual outlays may also be driven well
above current estimates by future legislative
changes that cannot be included in official
cost projections.8 When the full drug subsidy
becomes effective in 2006, many seniors will
find that the benefit does not cover a sub-
stantial portion of their drug costs. They are
likely to continue pressing for a more gener-
ous subsidy—and policymakers are likely to
accommodate such demands. Sen. Edward
Kennedy (D-MA) is already on record that
the current drug subsidy represents a mere
down payment on adequate drug coverage
for seniors.9
Some Democrats in Congress have pro-
posed a more generous program that would
increase outlays by $1 trillion in total over the
next decade. If policymakers fill some of the
significant gaps in coverage in the current
subsidy over the next few years, the drug ben-
efit enacted in 2003 could conceivably cost
twice its latest cost estimate of $720 billion.
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The history of the gap between budget
estimates and actual Medicare costs does not
leave one sanguine about likely future out-
comes. Actual Medicare spending has usual-
ly come in much higher than initial projec-
tions, reflecting changes that could not be
anticipated in the behavior of patients and
providers, changes in the practice of medi-
cine, and changes in legislation. For example,
in 1965 the actuaries estimated that hospital
insurance under Medicare would cost about
$9 billion annually by 1990.10 Actual spend-
ing was about $67 billion in that year.
History will most likely repeat itself.
Congress has awarded a drug benefit that
today appears to cost $720 billion on net
over 10 years. The actual cost over the next 10
years could easily be substantially higher.
Medicare Spending Must
Be Controlled
House Republicans proposed to limit the
overall cost of the Medicare drug benefit to
prevent spending from skyrocketing, but that
provision was ultimately dropped from the
final bill. Although spending could be arbi-
trarily limited, such a measure could have
unintended consequences unless considerable
flexibility and consumer choice are built into
the program. Poorly designed spending limits
could cause beneficiaries to shift from pre-
scription drugs to other, less-restricted forms
of treatment, which could raise overall
Medicare costs and worsen health outcomes.
Perhaps the most direct way to limit pro-
gram cost is to cap total spending for prescrip-
tion drugs in each year. Spending in excess of
the cap in one year could be “recouped” the fol-
lowing year by reducing the federal prescrip-
tion drug subsidy. Plans would pass that
reduction on to beneficiaries by raising premi-
ums or reducing the benefit (through
increased cost-sharing requirements and
tighter drug formularies). Some people have
suggested that cost sharing could be automat-
ically increased for middle- and upper-income
beneficiaries, while those with low incomes
were protected from cost increases. 
That general approach could be effective in
reining in the government’s prescription drug
costs. But the exclusive focus on prescription
drugs overlooks the broader fiscal problem
facing Medicare. Even without a new drug
benefit, Medicare spending is rising at an
unsustainably high rate. The Medicare pro-
gram has been growing substantially faster
than the economy. Ignoring the early years of
Medicare’s existence (when rapid growth of
outlays is only natural), Medicare outlays have
grown more than twice as fast as the nation’s
GDP in real terms. Calculations based on the
CBO’s historical data suggest that since 1980
Medicare outlays have grown about 2.2 per-
centage points faster than GDP.11 The baby
boomers, who begin to turn age 65 in seven
years, will place unprecedented new demands
on Medicare and will likely cause the differ-
ence in the two growth rates to widen during
coming decades.
Moreover, if the new drug benefit were
singled out as a target for spending controls,
we would run the risk of biasing treatment
decisions. Medical practitioners and patients
would opt for other, less-regulated treatment
procedures that would frustrate attempts to
slow Medicare spending without harming
patient welfare. Rather than trying to control
the costs of individual health services, as
Medicare has tried unsuccessfully to do over
the past four decades, we should integrate
prescription drugs with all other benefits.
Our proper concern should be the overall
growth in health spending. Micromanaging
the cost of individual services has proven to
be both ineffective and inefficient.
The traditional Medicare program is an
uncapped entitlement to payment for health
care providers. The payment incentives foster
ever-expanding spending for services that, at
the margin, are not worth what they cost. A
new approach, modeled after the premium
support system of the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program, is needed if we are
to control costs sensibly. By offering benefi-
ciaries real choice among health plans, we
can promote competition that over time can
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slow the growth of spending and improve the
value of what we purchase.
The new law takes a step in that direction.
MMA introduces a new approach to competi-
tion that places the traditional Medicare pro-
gram and the private plans on a more even foot-
ing, at least on an experimental basis. Begin-
ning in 2010 in selected market areas, all plans
(including traditional Medicare) would bid
against the same benchmark. Beneficiaries
would pay lower premiums if they enrolled in
plans with below-average costs. Those choosing
traditional Medicare might face higher or lower
premiums, depending on whether the tradi-
tional program is effective at containing cost.
That premium support provision in
MMA is authorized as a six-year demonstra-
tion project. If the project is implemented, it
will begin to move us toward premium sup-
port and fair competition among all the
health plans in Medicare. However, the proj-
ect is not likely to be undertaken. A similar
approach was attempted during the late
1990s and failed because of grassroots oppo-
sition from local health providers and politi-
cians. Their concern was that competition
might, in fact, be effective in limiting federal
reimbursements. The MMA provision has
already met resistance of the same sort from
several members of Congress, who have
declared “not in my back yard” six years
before the start of the demonstration.
Despite the opposition, the issue of pre-
mium support is not dead. Medicare’s deteri-
orating financial condition will reopen the
question of whether market competition or
government control is more effective in
bringing the rising cost of the program in
line with our willingness and ability to pay. 
Medicare’s Long-Term
Funding Shortfall Is
Enormous
Before the drug law was passed, the politi-
cal debate focused on the $400 billion taxpay-
er cost projected by the CBO for the next 10
years. Few policymakers at that time anticipat-
ed that the estimated cost of the new benefit
would escalate so soon after the law’s enact-
ment. The latest 10-year net cost estimate pub-
lished by the president’s budget office is $720
billion—80 percent larger than the initial esti-
mate—and there is no reason to think that is
the last word on the subject. 
The drug subsidy makes a permanent com-
mitment to a new Medicare benefit, but there
is no explicit commitment of resources to pay
the cost. That means reliance on general rev-
enue transfers—in other words, increasing the
federal budget deficit.
There are substantial political and eco-
nomic risks in legislating a permanent expan-
sion of Medicare benefits without good esti-
mates of its future cost. The option of cutting
back coverage may not be available if we come
up short on resources. That would mean cut-
ting other federal programs or imposing huge
and self-defeating tax burdens on future gen-
erations. As the baby boomers retire and
enroll in Medicare, that dire scenario is likely
to play out. If effective cost containment mea-
sures are not added, future generations will
face massive bills to support the more gener-
ous Medicare entitlement.
The Medicare trustees estimate that the
present value of the government’s unfunded
obligation attributable to the drug benefit is
$16.6 trillion. That figure understates the
problem since it is based on an optimistically
low assumption about future cost growth.
The estimate assumes that the per beneficia-
ry growth in drug spending remains only 1
percent greater than the growth of GDP per
capita through 2080, with spending growth
assumed to slow thereafter.12
Medicare spending has grown at substan-
tially higher rates over its 40-year history.
Program spending on a per capita basis has
grown about twice as fast as GDP per capita
since 1980. Using a growth rate in line with
historical experience through 2040 and
assuming much slower growth in spending
subsequently, the government’s unfunded lia-
bility amounts to $21.9 trillion.13 That is
about double the size of the U.S. economy this
year.
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As large as those figures are, they do not
capture the full magnitude of Medicare’s
financial crisis. In addition to the new drug
benefit, Medicare Parts A and B are also
underfunded. According to the trustees, the
entire Medicare program falls short by some
$61.6 trillion in today’s dollars.14 By compar-
ison, Social Security is a model of fiscal recti-
tude, with unfunded obligations of about
$10.4 trillion in present value.15
Those figures demonstrate the serious-
ness of our financing challenges for Medicare
based on the current structure of that pro-
gram. If a future Congress enacts effective
reforms, especially stronger incentives for
competition, the funding shortfall could be
substantially reduced.
Huge Long-Term Cost Will
Be Borne by Younger
Generations
Although the MMA does not address how
the drug benefit will be financed, ultimately
someone will have to pay the bills. Congress
will no doubt try to reduce overall Medicare
spending in future budget deals, once outlays
grow so large that they can no longer be
financed through additional debt creation.
Then the choice will be to scale back the pro-
gram or tolerate wider-ranging cuts in other
programs. Or Congress could raise taxes to
prevent the political fallout from burgeoning
deficits. However, that is sure to cause slower
economic growth as workers scale back their
market labor supply.
Tax hikes appear to be the most probable
outcome, simply because once the baby
boomers retire, they will constitute a potent
political force seeking to preserve and expand
their entitlement to Medicare benefits. 
Suppose we were to enact a new permanent
tax on wages sufficient to pay for the addition-
al benefits. How large would it have to be to
fully fund the projected outlay increase due to
the new drug benefit? Let us assume that such
a tax is levied immediately. Today’s seniors—
who are already out of the labor force—would
pay little of the new taxes. Measured in today’s
dollars, the value of drug benefits net of taxes
per capita for those aged 59 and older would be
$22,500 ($23,600 in additional benefits and
$1,000 in additional taxes). Baby boomers—76
million Americans aged between 40 and 58—
would shoulder a little more of the cost, but
they would come out significantly ahead. The
average boomer would receive $35,500 in ben-
efits (measured in today’s dollars) and would
pay about $17,300 in new taxes—a net gain of
$18,200 in present value.
The losers are 162 million young people
and all future generations. Those born
between 1966 and 1990 would lose, on net,
$2,498 each. Those born between 1991 and
2004 would lose $4,190 each. Thus, children,
who obviously do not get to vote, and very
young workers, who tend to not vote in large
numbers, would pay the most.
Congress is unlikely to consider ways to pay
for the new Medicare outlays until there is a fis-
cal crisis brought on by rising budget deficits.
The longer Congress waits to pay its bills, the
more those costs will be shifted from older gen-
erations to younger ones. Delaying the tax
increase by 10 years, for example, reduces the
tax burden on boomers by about $10,800 per
person. Very young workers and today’s chil-
dren could also gain because they would escape
higher taxes for 10 years. However, their gain
would be offset by the need to raise taxes even
higher subsequently to finance today’s drug
coverage costs that are paid for by borrowing.
Future generations would unambiguously lose
by a larger amount because a 10-year delay in
action on reforming Medicare compels higher
future tax increases.
Conclusion
The Medicare prescription drug benefit is
likely to cost much more and do less good
than previously anticipated. Federal outlays
will almost certainly grow faster over the next
decade than current estimates indicate, and
the added liability that will be incurred over
the long term is enormous. Despite all of that
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spending, Congress will hear plenty of com-
plaints over the coming years that the benefit
is not good enough.
Rationalizing Medicare benefits to include
prescription drugs may well have made sense,
but Congress erred in failing to address how
that benefit would be financed. As a result,
financial pressures on the program have been
increased significantly, moving us that much
closer to crisis.
The Medicare Modernization Act included
a number of reform steps intended to pro-
mote competition among health plans and
improve the efficiency with which health care
is delivered to America’s seniors. But those
measures are unlikely to change the basic
character of the program, which remains firm-
ly rooted in the insurance market of 1965 and
top-down control by Congress. If Medicare is
to survive the onslaught of the baby boomers,
more thorough reform is needed. 
A fiscal crisis in Medicare and, by implica-
tion, for the federal government, can be avert-
ed, but not without a great deal of effort. The
policy objective should be to moderate the
growth in health costs without putting an
undue burden on the recipients. The Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program, which
has served federal employees and retirees well
for 45 years, presents a practical model that
could be adapted to the special circum-
stances of the Medicare population.
There are risks in undertaking such a
reform. But one fact is clear: we do not have
the option of the status quo. We can either
take prudent actions to make Medicare sus-
tainable, or we can accept the program’s
inevitable decline at the hands of political
inaction—a decline that may not be limited to
Medicare and may adversely affect other eco-
nomic sectors as well.
Appendix: Untangling the 
Medicare Drug Benefit’s 
Cost Estimates
Controversy erupted when the adminis-
tration’s latest budget revealed an apparent
increase in the cost of Medicare’s prescrip-
tion drug benefit. But closer scrutiny indi-
cates there is less here than meets the eye. The
full drug benefit will not begin until January
2006, and there is no new information about
how it will work or how much it will ulti-
mately cost. We attempt to sort out the con-
fusing multitude of cost estimates emanat-
ing from official agencies since before the
enactment of the Medicare Modernization
Act (MMA) in 2003.
Budget Target
$400 billion: The 10-year budget target set
by Congress for the prescription drug bene-
fit. If the MMA’s net cost during the 10-year
budget window (2004–13) had been estimat-
ed to be larger, the bill would have been sub-
ject to a point of order in the Senate and
would have required 60 votes for passage.
Although the Congressional Budget Office’s
pre-enactment estimate showed that the
MMA’s net cost would not exceed $400 bil-
lion over 10 years, the law did not limit the
actual financial exposure of the federal gov-
ernment after its enactment.
Major program expansions typically
phase in over time, costing relatively little in
early years until the program is fully imple-
mented. The first two years of the 2004–13
period provided a low-cost transitional dis-
count card program. The full higher-cost
benefit will begin in January 2006 and will
remain in force indefinitely (until it can be
funded as specified under present law).
Original CBO Estimate
The CBO is the official budget scorekeep-
er for Congress. Only CBO estimates are for-
mally taken into account in the legislative
process.
$395 billion: The original CBO estimate of
the net cost of all the MMA provisions during
2004–13. That includes the drug benefit and
other changes in Medicare. It also incorpo-
rates all offsetting savings accruing within
Medicare and other federal programs (such
as the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program).
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$409 billion: The original CBO estimate of
the net cost of the drug benefit alone. This
number accounts for total federal outlays for
prescription drugs and three cost offsets: (a)
Medicare Part D beneficiary premiums, (b)
reduced federal drug costs in Medicaid, and
(c) state payments to the federal government
(“clawback”) to compensate partly for shift-
ing those already eligible for drug coverage
under Medicaid (“dual eligibles”) onto
Medicare.
Original Administration Estimate
The administration relies on the Office of
the Actuary in the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services to estimate costs of pend-
ing legislation. Those estimates are advisory
and are not considered in the formal con-
gressional process. OACT and CBO generally
confer about assumptions and data, but each
group makes its own independent judg-
ments in developing cost estimates.16
$534 billion: OACT’s original estimate of
the MMA’s net cost during 2004–13. This
estimate corresponds to CBO’s $395 billion
estimate.
$511 billion: OACT’s original estimate of
the net cost of the drug benefit alone, corre-
sponding to CBO’s $408 billion estimate.
Administration’s New Estimate
The administration provided an updated
cost estimate for the Medicare drug benefit
in its 2006 budget. The new estimate covers
the 10-year budget window that the 109th
Congress faces this year—2006–15. The
MMA calls for Part D benefits to begin in
2006, and that higher-cost benefit will be
available in all of those years (rather than in 8
of 10 years as in the 2004–13 window). The
estimate also reflects minor adjustments in
economic assumptions, such as the inflation
rate. The time series of new estimates are
almost identical to those of the earlier esti-
mates for the period 2006–13, indicating that
no new information has become available on
which to base a new analysis.17
$724 billion: The administration’s estimate
of net cost of the MMA’s drug benefit during
2006–15. This accounts for the sizable cost
offsets (from beneficiaries, states, and federal
savings on Medicaid) described earlier. This
estimate is consistent with the earlier $511
billion estimate for 2004–13, except that it
applies to the 2006–15 budget window.
$1.2 trillion: The administration’s estimate
of the gross cost of the drug benefit for
2006–15, ignoring the cost offsets built into
the program.
CBO’s New Estimate
In a February 9, 2005, letter to Rep. Bill
Thomas, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, CBO explained that it
has not substantially revised its estimate of
the budget cost of the Medicare drug bene-
fit.18 The latest CBO estimates cover the
2006–15 budget window. They incorporate
minor changes in economic assumptions but
none about the operation of the program. 
These new CBO estimates are confined to
the drug benefit’s impact on Medicare,
including the cost savings that would accrue
to Medicare. They do not include savings in
Medicaid or in other federal programs aris-
ing from the drug benefit. Consequently, the
numbers are not comparable with the initial
CBO estimates or the recent widely cited esti-
mates from the administration, and they do
not accurately represent the net impact of the
drug benefit on the federal budget.
$552 billion: CBO’s 2004–13 estimate of
the net increase in Medicare outlays due to
the drug benefit, using CBO’s original calcu-
lations. 
$558 billion: CBO’s 2004–13 estimate of
the net increase in Medicare outlays due to
the drug benefit, using revised economic
assumptions. The $6 billion increase demon-
strates that the revisions CBO has made in
the past two years are trivial.
$795 billion: CBO’s 2006–15 estimate of
the net increase in Medicare outlays due to
the drug benefit.19 This estimate is not com-
parable with the administration’s latest esti-
mates because it omits savings accruing to
programs other than Medicare.
$735 billion: Authors’ calculation extrapo-
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lating CBO’s estimate of savings to Medicaid
and other federal programs (other than
Medicare). This is our estimate of the drug
benefit’s net cost to the federal government
during 2006–15. It is based on CBO’s letter to
Chairman Thomas and could be compared
with the administration’s $724 billion esti-
mate.
Long-Term Estimates
Although 10-year estimates provide useful
guidance to lawmakers during budget delib-
erations, they understate the cost of pro-
grams intended to continue indefinitely.20
$721 billion: Medicare trustees’ estimate of
the general revenue contributions to the Part
D drug benefit during 2004–13. Because gen-
eral revenues are not specifically earmarked
for that benefit, this represents an unfunded
obligation created by the enactment of the
MMA. It does not account for savings in
Medicaid or other federal programs.
Consequently, it overstates the actual impact
of the drug benefit on the federal budget. 
$8.1 trillion: Medicare trustees’ estimate of
the present value through 2078 of general
revenue contributions to the Medicare Part
D drug benefit.  
$16.6 trillion: Medicare trustees’ estimate
of the present value of general revenue con-
tributions to the drug benefit using an infi-
nite time horizon. This measure more fully
captures the long-term budget impact of the
program than does arbitrarily truncating the
estimate at 75 years into the future.
Notes
1.  See 2004 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the
Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust Funds, March 23, 2004, Table
II.C22, p. 108. Hereafter, 2004 Trustees’ Report. This is
the “infinite horizon” estimate, which computes
the present value of the funding shortfall assuming
that Part D continues in perpetuity. 
2.  See ibid., Table II.B11, p. 60, and Table II.C16,
p. 99. Part A is underfunded by $21.8 trillion and
Part B is underfunded by $23.2 trillion. 
3.  See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Letter to Chairman
Thomas on the cost estimate for H.R. 1 (Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Moderni-
zation Act of 2003), November 20, 2003, http://
www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4808&sequence
=0; see also Congressional Budget Office, The Budget
and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005 to 2014
(Washington: CBO, January 2004), pp. 12–13. The
CBO estimates that the Medicare drug benefit will
increase federal outlays by $409 billion between
2004 and 2013; MMA, which also includes some
provisions to reduce Medicare spending, will
increase federal outlays by $395 billion. The CBO
recently released a report indicating that their orig-
inal estimate for the cost of the drug benefit was
$408 billion. See the Appendix for a detailed expla-
nation of the multitude of MMA and drug benefit
cost estimates
4.  See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2005, and FY06, Summary Table S-13, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/bud
get.html. The drug benefit alone was estimated to
cost $649 billion, according to the 2004 Trustees’
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